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IS Explanations for Software Development Failures
Samer Faraj
Robert Geter
IS Department
Maryland Business School
University of Maryland
Abstract
The failure of IS development projects remains a relatively understudied phenomena in organizations. Much
of the early work on project failures has focused on understanding the IS view of project failure. In this
preliminary study, we report on 19 in-depth interviews with managers of failed projects. By using group
conflict theory as a lens to analyze the IS/client relationships during and after project failure, we are able to
show that IS managers rarely apportion any blame to themselves and their group, but rather prefer to blame
either situational factors or their clients.

Introduction
It is widely known that IS organizations struggle with the task of developing software products on time, on budget, and
according to client specifications. The general computer literature is replete with examples of failed development projects.
According to the Standish Group, only 27% of U.S. software projects are completed on time and on budget. Forty percent of
U.S. software development projects fail utterly (Gabriel, 1997). This problem is a long standing one in organizations but one
that has become much more costly and visible with failures such as the Denver airport automated baggage system, the IRS
modernization effort, and the FAA Stars system overrunning their budgets by billions of dollars. Recent practitioner-oriented
treatise about “software runaways” (Glass, 1998) and “death march” (Yourdon, 1997) project the metaphor of an out of control
beast that is practically impossible to bring to heel. This paper attempts to evaluate the phenomena of software project failure
through an in-depth investigation of multiple project failures. Based on the evaluation of 12 case studies, we then propose issues
for further research as well as recommendations for practitioners.
In most organizations software development involves an active partnership between IS and their clients. The client tends
to be responsible for providing detailed requirements and some level of project oversight, while IS is primarily responsible for
developing a time and cost estimate of the required work effort, and delivering an IS product that meets the client’s functional,
budgetary, and scheduling requirements. Consequences for IS project failure can be severe. When large sums of money and
resources are committed to IS development efforts that fail explanations must be offered to senior management. An IS group
that cannot control budget and schedules may be punished by traditional organizational means such as: demoting or firing
responsible managers, reducing the resources available to the IS group including refusing to let them include new technologies
in their projects. In some cases, reporting structures change from centralized (where the entire IS organization reports to a CIO),
to decentralized (where IS application development departments report to business unit heads). In extreme cases, entire IS
departments are outsourced (e.g. XEROX, GM, etc.).
In view of the economic impact of project failure and the often weak political position of IS within an organization
dominated by functional or cross-functional groups, explanations for project failures will vary depending upon the person or
organization (IS or client) providing the account. We believe that in dysfunctional organizations IS will generally blame their
clients for project failures and in turn be blamed by the clients.

Existing Literature
Researchers have generally investigated IS project failure by focusing on the IS function. They looked for failure causes
(Keider, 1984; Ewusi-Mensah and Przasynski,1991); how commitment to a failing projects escalates (Keil, 1995); and the early
warning signs of failure (Ginsberg, 1981).
Earlier observations from the IS literature point to a variety of factors such as: user attitude or support (Lyytinen &
Hirschheim, 1987; Keider, 1984; McFarlan, 1981), user domain knowledge (Roman, 1983; Balachandra and Raelin, 1980), user
initiated changes (Staw and Ross, 1987), and project team/user interaction (Schmitt and Kozar, 1978; Powers and Dickson, 1973)
as a reason for project failure. In hostile finger-pointing environments IS/client teams do not learn from their mistakes and do
not learn how to work together effectively. Rather, than concentrating on keeping the ship from going down, each side is focused
on how to deflect blame when the ship begins to sink.
More recently, Ewusi-Mensah & Prazynski (1991) surveyed 23 developers who witnessed failed projects. They found that
failure was a complex and multi-dimensional issue that included economic factors (i.e. budget and time overruns) as well as
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technical factors. Recent studies by Glass (1998) and Ewusi-Mensah (1997) paint an even more complex picture with no single
factor being identified as a predominant cause of project failure. These studies like most of the earlier ones are focused on the
IS function and how it reports and views the complex process of how a project fails. This limited perspective leads necessarily
to a skewed view of reality, one that is socially constructed to present IS developers in the best light.

A Conflict Theory Perspective
We take the perspective that many IS and clients organizations have evolved into competing groups, that is their interests
overlap, and thus are in direct conflict. Based on group conflict theory, the appropriate frame of reference to understand intergroup behavior is the functional relation that exists between two or more groups (Sherif, 1966).
The principle goal of any group is to sustain itself by maintaining its place and position in a constantly changing
environment. Groups come into conflict with one another when their interests and purposes overlap, encroach on one another,
and become competitive (Vold, 1985). Groups in conflict view the other as an adversary rather than a neutral party and develop
a negative stereotype of the other side. Such groups become more close knit and demand conformity and loyalty from members.
The other side is often accused of “playing unfair” and interactions decrease or become stylized (Shein, 1980; Taylor and
Moghaddam, 1987).

Methodology
For this study we were interested in (1) determining whether IS project managers tend to assign blame for project failures
to their clients, rather than accepting responsibility and (2) exploring the potential impact of these explanations on inter-group
(IS/client) working relationships. To address these questions, we have so far selected and studied 19 project managers, from
14 different Fortune 500 organization, who have recently been involved with failed projects.
The managers were interviewed using semi-structured interviews and were asked to provide detailed explanations for
“failed” projects that they had either managed or participated in over the past two years. Interviews lasted between 40 to 90
minutes with a mean of approximately 60 minutes. Some interviews were conducted face-to-face, other interviews were
conducted over the telephone. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.

Results
All the projects that were reported on were effectively cancelled even though several interviewees mentioned that the official
status was often “postponement.” Six of the projects were cancelled after the requirements phase, four at the design phase, and
four at the implementation phase. The projects were on average 18 months over schedule at the time of cancellation.
The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews allowed a richer description of how projects failed to emerge. We focused
on the little studied process of project demise. We found group conflict theory to be a most useful theoretical lens through which
to study these failures, since in all cases a high level of conflict, acrimony and blame existed. From the rich text of the interviews,
a different perspective on project failures emerges. Our findings point not only to the weakness of rationalistic explanations of
why problems arose, but emphasize the importance of the conflict between the client organization and IS.
No manager identified technological issues as the key reason for causing their project to fail. In fact, the technological
ignorance on the users’ part was presented as a key reason for why a gap grew between the two parties. One manager
summarized the impact of the users not trusting his team’s technical ability by stating that: “they outsourced that [project] and
they have never been able to make that application work and they have been working on it for 1 ½ years now.” Overwhelmingly,
the managers provided explanations that tended to focus the blame away from the IS group and more onto situational and clientrelated factors.
Situational Blame Assignment. Managers tended to blame their most serious problems on situational problems, i.e.
problems caused by factors outside the control of the project team such as staff turnover or unexpected budget cuts. One manager
reflected: “the customer took a budget cut and had to cut one project and ours was the lowest return for the price.”
Another manager described the impact of a reengineering of the client organization: “basically what happened was over the
course of two years that we were working on the project, the customer department reorganized, redefined their mission, and
redefined their role in the organization.. the project no longer fell into their role.”
Blaming the client. The most common explanation presented about project failure was focused on the client. These issues
included the client’s inability to articulate or commit to a stable set of requirements. For instance, in one situation, “they came
to us and said in a construction analogy, build us a house, we want six houses. That is fine, we can build a house in a year. As
we got into it, the house turned into a four bedroom house, turned into a million dollar mansion.”
A second manager mirrored the concern about unstable requirements: “it started out as a basic inventory system…it turned
into a utility drive scheduling system, then it turned into: ‘lets make sure we order the product at the same time.’ The
requirements kept on expanding and also the customer base expanded as well.”
A third manager blamed the clients for a lack of commitment to the project: “I also was frustrated that the commitment was
secondary. They blew off our meetings or never came to them. They did not read the minutes of the meetings. The only work
that was done was at the meetings and that was when they happened to show up.”
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A fourth manager concurred: “I don’t think the manager for this particular area did anything to sell the importance of the
project. I don’t think they understood any priority.”

Impact of Assigning Blame
When IS project managers fail to keep their commitment to deliver products, they will tend to highlight client related failings
and blame the client. Claiming that they, “do not know how to build IS systems,” the clients blame IS. The greater the stakes
(e.g. size of the budget or impact on the profitability of the firm), the greater the chances that group leaders or whole groups may
meet with sanctions. Group interactions, already based on competing interests, now contain an element of mistrust. This
negatively impacts future project encounters as affronted groups place more focus on group survival than on the broader
organizational goals. The following two examples are illustrative of the kinds of group survival behaviors that we observed and
recorded:
Development of negative stereotypes. Members of frustrated IS groups viewed the clients as opponents when they
described how some clients will “request everything” and then position themselves outside of the information loop in order to
“claim ignorance.” In the words of one IS manager:“…bells and whistles kept getting added. I never felt we had the
commitment from the customer team. We wouldn’t get full representation from the customer area at requirement and status
meetings." In a similar case another project manager stated that, “I also was frustrated that the commitment was secondary –
they blew off our meetings or never came to them. They did not read the minutes of meetings. The only work they got done
was at the meetings, and that was when they happened to show up.” In another project, the users were duly involved but did not
seem to communicate with their own management: “We had a customer sitting with us as ‘the end-user’ but [later] the end-user’s
management said that the scope was all wrong and there were major changes.”
Stylizing the interaction process. When placed on the defensive, some IS groups will respond by reducing and formalizing
interactions and becoming inflexible. We have noted that some IS managers may demonstrate a, “this is what you asked for,
this is what you’ll get” attitude. During the process of collecting data we attended a client meeting with a business unit president,
his direct reports, two IS managers and an IS director. At one point during the meeting, the clients began to probe IS for potential
solutions to a technical problem. When asked for his input one of the project managers stated, “This appears to be a set-up
question. We have no ideas to contribute. Tell us exactly what you want and we will build it for you.” As predicted by Schein
(1980), the group becomes more closed and less willing to be vulnerable. As one alienated interviewee imparted: “they see us
as a resource that they can have when they want to have it. Unfortunately, it does not work that way.”

Conclusion
In this preliminary investigation, we challenge the single-sided IS view of project failure, that has been predominantly
reported in the literature. By using group conflict theory as a lens to analyze the IS/client relationships during and after project
failure, we were able to show that IS managers rarely apportion blame to themselves and their group, but prefer to blame either
situational factors or their clients. Our study lays the foundation for investigating the role of group conflict between IS and
clients in future development efforts. While this study has been limited to interviews with IS managers, future research on project
failure would benefit from comparing and contrasting the perspectives of users and developers alike.
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